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Repealing the Consumer Welfare
Standard: FTC as Central Economic
Planner?
BRYCE TOBIN*

ABSTRACT
The recent repeal of the consumer welfare standard and proposals for increased
rulemaking authority threaten to give the Federal Trade Commission an unprecedentedly massive ambit under which to regulate. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act,
the FTC is empowered to regulate unfair methods of competition as well as unfair
deceptive acts or practices that affect commerce. As of 2015, the FTC was tethered
to the consumer welfare standard when regulating under Section 5. However, in
July 2021, the FTC abrogated the 2015 policy statement, thereby giving itself the
ability to either replace the consumer welfare standard with a broader standard or
in fact replace it with no intelligible standard at all. The effect of this abrogation
allows the FTC to pursue a broad set of social goals with less scrutiny from outside
authorities. Furthermore, there have been recent proposals to allow the FTC to determine new methods of unfair competition under Section 6(g) of the FTC Act. The
expansion of this section not only represents a usurpation of legislative authority
but also hinders the ability of the FTC to regulate. The net effect of these changes
would harm companies and consumers by increasing the likelihood of errant intervention, increasing rent-seeking behavior by private interests, increasing inefficiency in the economy, and making it more difficult to create successful antitrust
regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FTC as Central Economic Planner
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), acting under Chair Lina Khan, has recently taken several steps in an effort to amass greater power in its antitrust enforcement.1 The FTC effectively abrogated its primary limiting principle when regulating unfair methods of competition when it repealed a 2015 policy statement that
bound its regulatory authority to operate in the interest of consumer welfare.2 What
is more, the FTC has recently claimed that Section 6(g) of the FTC Act allows the
FTC to define unfair methods of competition as it sees fit. 3 In affording the FTC
such power, the FTC would be authorized to act both arbitrarily and without transparency.4 The net effect of these moves harms both companies and consumers by
increasing the likelihood of errant intervention on the part of the FTC, incentivizing
rent-seeking behaviors by private interests, and increasing overall inefficiency in
the economy.5 Moreover, acting without an intelligible standard would make it
more difficult for the FTC to regulate and harder to hold the FTC accountable when
it fails to regulate judiciously.6

B. Historical Background
To understand the recent moves taken by the FTC, one must grasp the historical
foundation on which current antitrust enforcement lies. The Sherman and Clayton
Anti-Trust Acts, passed in 1890 and 1914, created antitrust policies that prohibited
monopolization, restraint of trade, unfair competitive tactics, and mergers that
might substantively diminish competition.7 Providing enforcement authority to
these enactments, the Federal Trade Commission Act, also passed in 1914, gave
power to a board of government experts to examine business conduct and prevent
or reduce anticompetitive practices. 8 These policies were implemented in response
1. Jeffrey Westling, FTC’s Shifting View on Competition Policy and the Outlook for 2022,
AMERICAN ACTION FORUM (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ftcs-shiftingview-on-competition-policy-and-the-outlook-for-2022/; Maureen K. Ohlhausen & James Rill, Pushing
the Limits? A Primer on FTC Competition Rulemaking, 2, (U.S. Chamber of Commerce ed., 2021),
https://www.uschamber.com/assets/archived/images/ftc_rulemaking_white_paper_aug12.pdf.
2. Westling, supra note 1.
3. Ohlhausen & Rill, supra note 1.
4. Alden Abbott, US Antitrust Laws: A Primer, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON
UNIVERSITY (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/antitrust-policy/us-antitrust-lawsprimer.
5. Abbott, supra note 4; Elyse Dorsey, Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Hipster Antitrust Meets
Public Choice Economics: The Consumer Welfare Standard, Rule of Law, and Rent Seeking, 3, (CPI
Antitrust Chronicle ed., 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165192.
6. Trevor Wagener, The Curse of Tradeoffs: Neo-Brandeisians vs. Consumers, DISCO: DISRUPTIVE
COMPETITION PROJECt, (May 21, 2021), https://www.project-disco.org/competition/052121-the-curseof-tradeoffs-neo-brandeisian-antitrust-versus-consumers/.
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sherman_antitrust_act#:~:text=The%20Sherman%20Antitrust%20Act%20of,%C2%A7%C2%A7%201%2D38; The Clayton Antitrust Act, History, Art & Archives, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Oct. 8, 2014), https://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032424979#:~:text=The%20newly%20created%20Federal%20Trade,unions%20legal%20under%20federal%20law.
8. Abbott, supra note 4.
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to growing concerns from the public over the increasing power and size of companies in the United States at the turn of the 20th century and the consequent anticompetitive effects in the marketplace.9 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who
occupied the bench from 1916 to 1939, believed that the scale of a company could
constitute a sufficient reason to regulate a company if it would prevent anticompetitive effects on smaller businesses. 10 Carrying forward this idea, from the 1940s
through the 1960s, antitrust enforcement became increasingly focused on concentration within industry, and this focus led to many successful lawsuits against horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers.11 However, a shift occurred in the latter
half of the 20th century when the Chicago School’s economic theories rose to the
forefront of antitrust policy.12 These theories advocated for policies that augmented
consumer welfare and rejected regulation on the basis of industry structure. 13 The
popularization of such theories gave way to a number of landmark decisions that
figured antitrust policy in the interests of consumers.14 “In 1979, the U.S. Supreme
Court proclaimed the antitrust laws to be a ‘consumer welfare prescription,’ and
ever since, the prevailing view among courts has been that antitrust’s sole end is
consumer welfare. . .”15
In 2017, Lina Khan, then a law student at Yale, rose to prominence with the
publication of her article, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” in the Yale Law Journal.16
In the article, she claimed that current antitrust policy, especially the consumer welfare standard, is far too short-term in its outlook and is therefore insufficient in
identifying and counteracting the anticompetitive tactics of major technology companies such as Amazon.17 She further charged that the strategy and structure of Amazon allow for anticompetitive conduct that eludes current antitrust enforcement.18
She argued that what is needed are policies that look at the competitive process as
a whole, the structure of a company, and the structure of the underlying market in
which the company resides.19
In 2018, she published “The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Anti-Monopoly Debate” in the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, in which
she echoed a sentiment shared by Justice Brandeis, arguing that the growing number

9. Sherman Antitrust Act, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Sherman-AntitrustAct; The Clayton Antitrust Act, History, Art & Archives, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Oct.
8,
2014),
https://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032424979#:~:text=The%20newly%20created%20Federal%20Trade,unions%20legal%20under%20federal%20law.
10. Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement,
33 TOURO L. REV. 277, 300, 314 (2017),
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2808&context=lawreview.
11. Abbott, supra note 4.
12. Abbott supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits of Antitrust in the 21st Century, 68 KAN. L. REV. 1097, 1109
(2020).
16. David Streitfield, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html.
17. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710, 716-17 (2017),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox.
18. Id.
19. Id at 717.
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of monopolies in America threaten both political power and small business.20 This
set of ideas that Lina Khan, and a number of other similarly-minded scholars, champion is known as the New Brandeis School, so named for its similarity to the policies advocated for by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. 21
The New Brandeis School’s central distinguishing feature is the rejection of
the consumer welfare standard.22 It avers that the consumer welfare standard weakens antitrust enforcement by attending to short-term price effects.23 Advocates of
the school desire to replace the consumer welfare standard with a multi-factor approach, otherwise known as a public interest standard.24 This standard would allow
the FTC and courts to enforce an array of non-price effects that arise out of business
conduct.25 The multi-factor approach would incorporate factors such as income inequality, unemployment, worker mobility, wage disparities, political influence, and
small business formation and growth.26 In March 2021, President Biden appointed
Lina Khan as Chair of the FTC, giving her the ability to take steps to employ many
of her ideas in antitrust enforcement.27

II. REPEAL OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD
A. Khan’s Vision for the FTC
Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act states, “[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”28
In 2015, the FTC released a policy statement codifying the consumer welfare
standard and the rule of reason into their regulatory guidelines.29 In the statement,
the FTC adopted the rule of reason and the consumer welfare standard to guide their
regulatory decisions.30 The 2015 policy statement provides that any violation of the
Sherman or Clayton Acts will constitute an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act in contravention of Section 5 of the FTC Act; however, it does
not constrain the FTC to enforce only violations of those acts. 31 It also allows enforcement against actions that “contravene the spirit of the antitrust laws and those
that, if allowed to mature or complete, could violate the Sherman or Clayton

20. Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. OF EUROPEAN
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131 (2018), https://academic.oup.com/jeclap/article/9/3/131/4915966.
21. Joseph Coniglio, Why the ‘New Brandeis Movement’ Gets Antitrust Wrong, SSRN, at 1 (Apr. 24,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3166286.
22. Dorsey, supra note 5, at 8.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Russell Brandom & Makena Kelly, Tech Antitrust Pioneer Lina Khan Will Officially Lead the
FTC, THE VERGE (Jun. 15, 2021, 12:22 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/6/15/22527709/linakhan-ftc-commissioner-competition-facebook-amazon-google-apple.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
29. Donald S. Clark,, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, FTC (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Acts.”32 The 2015 policy statement also ensured that the FTC would be tethered to
the consumer welfare standard when it regulates conduct that lies beyond those
acts.33
However, in July of 2021, the FTC, acting under Chair Lina Khan, repealed the
2015 policy statement, asserting that adherence to the consumer welfare standard
“contravene[d] the text, structure, and history of Section 5” and too greatly restricts
the FTC’s authority.34 The 2021 statement explained that the FTC Act was enacted
by Congress “to provide an alternative institutional framework for enforcing the
antitrust laws” and to create an administrative body that could provide more competent and accountable regulation than courts could provide.35 Instead of using
preexisting language from the Sherman Act or another piece of antitrust legislation,
Section 5 used new language when it declared “unfair methods of competition unlawful.”36 The FTC argues that this is evidence Congress intended Section 5 to extend further than the Sherman Act.37 On the other hand, Section 5 does not allow
for a private right of action and prohibits the Commission from pursuing criminal
charges for violations of the Act.38 The FTC argues that Section 5 presents a compromise in this way by providing a limited number of remedies against infractions
but granting the authority to “shape doctrine and reach conduct not otherwise prohibited by the Sherman Act.”39
The July policy statement further charges that the 2015 statement relinquishes
the Commission’s primary strengths “as an administrative agency with the power
to adjudicate cases, issue rules and industry guidance, and conduct detailed marketplace studies,” by constraining Section 5 to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 40 The
statement asserts that the expert body of the FTC must ironically yield to non-expert
judges in private actions under the Sherman Act.41 Section 5 is also subject to a rule
of reason-style framework, allowing courts to judge whether any business conduct
is unreasonable.42 Courts make this assessment by weighing the “procompetitive”
effects against the “anticompetitive” effects.43 The FTC argues that the employment
of this rule “leads to soaring enforcement costs, risks inconsistent outcomes, and
has been decried by judges as unadministrable or exceedingly difficult to meet.” 44
Furthermore, in almost every rule of reason case in the last 45 years, the defendant
has prevailed on the basis that the plaintiff was unable to show a “substantial anticompetitive effect.”45
The FTC asserts that the 2021 statement was also necessary because the 2015
statement was “rife with internal contradictions that may effectively read the
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. FTC, On the Withdrawal of the Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods
of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, at 1 (Jul. 9, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1591706/p210100commnstmtwithdrawalsec5enforcement.pdf.
35. Id. at 2-3.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 6.
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Commission’s standalone Section 5 authority out of the statute altogether.”46 The
statement prohibits conduct that, if allowed to be completed, would violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts.47 However, the statement also requires the FTC to prove
“‘likely’ anticompetitive effects under the rule of reason.”48 This effectively nullifies the FTC’s duty to penalize wrongdoing before it harms consumers.49 The 2015
Statement says that it will refrain from bringing a standalone Section 5 case in most
cases where the Sherman or Clayton Acts already apply.50 The FTC argues that this
has so narrowed the field of cognizable standalone Section 5 cases that there are
few, if any, possible cases that the FTC could bring for such a violation. 51 “Almost
every practice that is unlawful under the rule of reason would already be subject to
the Sherman or Clayton Acts and thus. . . be improper targets for standalone section
5 enforcement.”52 The statement concludes by declaring that the repeal of the 2015
Statement is only the beginning of efforts to clarify Section 5 of the Act and that
the FTC will consider issuing new guidance or rules to interpret Section 5 in the
ensuing months.53
In the wake of the repeal of the consumer welfare standard, Chair Lina Khan
has provided a set of goals and priorities to guide the regulatory approach of the
FTC.54 The first principle set out is the need for a “holistic approach” where the
FTC may look beyond consumer welfare and consider harms toward workers and
independent businesses as well.55 Second, she advocates for regulating structural
incentives or “root causes” in lieu of mere effects of these incentives. 56This would
involve the regulation of “conflicts of interest, business models, or structural dominance” as well as firms that are profiting from this conduct.57 She next emphasizes
the need to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to better understand the practical
elements of the market and firm dynamics.58 She also stresses that the FTC be proactive in preventing problems that may arise and a need for swiftness in the approach.59 The fifth and final principle is the democratization of the agency to provide a regulatory policy that is in touch with “real problems” Americans are facing
in their lives.60
In the realm of her priorities, Khan desires to revise merger guidelines to provide enforcement that is both practically and theoretically sound.61 To this end, the
FTC will take a closer look at the nexus between private equity and corporations
that may allow for market dominance.62 Khan wishes to take aim at “take-it-or46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Lina Khan, Vision and Priorities of the FTC, 1, FTC, at 1 (Sept. 22, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1596664/agency_priorities_memo_from_chair_lina_m_khan_9-22-21.pdf.
55. Id. at 1-2.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.
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leave-it contracts.”63 This would include “non-competes, repair restrictions, and exclusionary clauses.”64 Khan has also set a number of operational objectives, including applying an integrated approach to policy, deeper connection to communities in
America, and widening the scope of disciplines to better inform regulation. 65
While these policy goals are not binding, they do provide insight into Khan’s
plans for the future of the FTC.66 The consumer welfare standard may be replaced
by a “multi-factor assessment that weighs market openness, economic fairness, democracy; and the interests of workers, entrepreneurs, independent businesses, and
consumers.”67 However, critics have alleged that the repeal of the consumer welfare
standard will create an antitrust policy that hurts the economy, increases uncertainty
in enforcement decisions, and makes it more difficult to regulate. They further encourage a return to the consumer welfare standard.68

B. The Problems with Repealing the Consumer Welfare
Standard
While it is possible that the broader scope of regulation afforded by the multifactor approach could give new life to an arguably sclerotic technology sector, it is
not clear that any standard would allow for a more effective regime of regulation
than the consumer welfare standard. The consumer welfare standard is considered
to be transparent and easy to administer.69 The test to determine whether a company
is engaging in anticompetitive conduct is straightforward.70 “Under a simple rule of
reason test employing the consumer welfare principle, one would have to consider
whether the challenged practice creates a sufficient inference of lower market-wide
output and higher prices.”71 If it does, it is unlawful.72
Furthermore, the consumer welfare standard prevents arbitrary action on the
part of regulators.73 The standard requires testable claims and counterclaims as part
of a competition case.74 It always questions whether the conduct will make consumers better or worse off.75 The consumer welfare standard may also encompass more
factors than just price.76 It allows the FTC to regulate on the basis of innovation,
quality, and product variety.77
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3-4.
66. Jeffrey J. Amato, David E. Dahlquist & Jay R. Wexler, FTC Chair Lina Khan Issues “Priorities”
Memo, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.winston.com/en/competition-corner/ftc-chair-lina-khan-issues-priorities-memo.html.
67. Abbott, supra note 4.
68. Abbott, supra note 4; See Wagener, supra note 6.
69. Christine S. Wilson, Welfare Standards Underlying Antitrust Enforcement: What You Measure is
What You Get, FTC, at 5 (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455663/welfare_standard_speech_-_cmr-wilson.pdf.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sam Bowman, The Consumer Welfare Standard: Bringing Objectivity to Antitrust, THE INT’L.
CTR. FOR LAW & ECONOMICS (Feb. 2021), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/tldrConsumer-Welfare-Standard.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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While the departure from the consumer welfare standard may present itself as
a logical first step, given the existence of increasing corporate consolidation, the
alternative standard put forth by the FTC presents tradeoffs that are not necessarily
favorable. A multi-factor standard is effectively no standard at all.78 Without any
standard, the FTC has an effective carte blanche to regulate in ways that could potentially harm both consumers and businesses. 79 There is no neutral way to weigh
these various factors, and, therefore, the likelihood that the regulatory power may
be used arbitrarily increases.80 It would also reduce transparency that exists under a
consumer welfare standard.81 Alternatively, it may lead to an inability to regulate
and an institutionally instantiated analysis paralysis.82
These various standards must be assessed based on their “predictability, administrability, and credibility of enforcement decisions.”83 The multi-factor assessment would lack both predictability and credibility, and it would likely lead to unpredictable outcomes due to the inability to assign weights to the various factors. 84
It may also result in outcomes contrary to consumer interests as a decision to regulate based on competition, instead of consumer welfare, is likely to decrease consumer welfare.85 However, the consumer welfare standard leads to predictable enforcement decisions that are easier to administer. 86 The formal approach under
which it is administered and the requirement of testable claims ensure the existence
of these three criteria.87 Credibility is also easy to foster, given that enforcement
decisions purportedly serve consumer welfare.88
Antitrust is concerned with regulating two types of behaviors: coordinated conduct and exclusionary actions.89 Coordinated conduct may become collusive and
exclusionary actions may create monopolism.90 However, there is no fine line in
determining how to regulate under an antitrust framework.91 While coordinated
conduct may be harmful, it can increase market output, and exclusionary actions
can benefit consumers.92
Since these behaviors may be either procompetitive or anticompetitive, regulators face potentially imposing costs on consumers.93 There are two types of costs
that may result from regulating under an antitrust framework: costs from mistaken
judgments and decision costs.94 Mistaken judgments can be divided up into false
convictions (Type I errors) and false acquittals (Type II errors).95 When the regulator falsely acquits a corporation, the regulator mistakenly stays its hand against
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Abbott, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wagener, supra note 6.
Wilson, supra note 69, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5.
See Wilson, supra note 69, at 5; See Bowman supra note 73.
See Wilson, supra note 69, at 5.
Lambert, supra note 15, at 1100.
Id.
Id. at 1100-01.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1100-01.
Id. at 1101.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol6/iss1/14

8

Tobin: Repealing the Consumer Welfare Standard: FTC as Central Economic

226

B.E.T.R.

[Vol. 6 2022

anticompetitive conduct.96 This results in higher prices for consumers, along with
reduced quality of products.97 When a regulator falsely convicts a corporation, the
regulator mistakenly punishes procompetitive conduct, which decreases market
output and also causes consumers to suffer.98 Decision costs result from “deciding
whether contemplated or actual conduct is forbidden or permitted” and are imposed
on business planners, litigating parties, and adjudicators.99 Judge Easterbrook, in
his article The Limits of Antitrust, argued that policies should be created such that
they “minimize the sum of error and decision costs.” 100 This allows regulators to
minimize costs while still creating as much benefit as possible. 101
When determining whether to regulate or not, the FTC must consider whether
succeeding on an enforcement action will impose greater losses than a market failure will. Under Easterbrook’s approach, “[l]osses from improvident interventions
are Type I (false conviction) error costs that must be balanced against the losses
from allowing market power to persist (Type II error costs).” 102 Regulation is likely
to create losses when the issue is too complicated for a centralized administration
to handle, and agencies are given broad authority over the allocation of resources. 103
Furthermore, breaking up highly integrated yet multi-faceted technology platforms
without creating consumer harm presents itself as a highly difficult task.104 To make
things worse, the grant of this excess of authority also opens the door to manipulation by special interests.105
“[A]n increase in the vagueness of the standard increases incentives for rentseeking activity.”106 The repeal of the consumer welfare standard would purportedly
allow the FTC to accomplish its broad social objectives by loosening the constraints
on the FTC’s regulatory action and employing this multi-factor approach.107 However, public choice economics and historical evidence suggest that the paradoxical
effect of this broadening of authority would be an increase in corporate control rather than less.108 Public choice economics is an economic theory that suggests government actors are susceptible to incentives in the same way that non-government
actors are susceptible to such incentives.109 The historical record, viewed under the
lens of this theory, demonstrates that “the consumer welfare standard reduced incentives for rent-seeking and brought the rule of law to antitrust.”110
This broadening of authority for the FTC effectively opens the door to increasing rent-seeking behavior by companies.111 “Economic rents, or returns in excess of
a firm’s opportunity cost, refer to those rents artificially created and awarded

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1101-02.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1126-27.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1127.
Dorsey, supra note 5, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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through government action.”112 The availability of these rents incentivizes companies to seek them, oftentimes through lobbying, campaign donations, or complaints
to regulatory authorities of a competitor’s illicit behavior.113 When this rent-seeking
behavior is successful in the erection of regulatory or legislative barriers, it results
in welfare losses similar to those seen in cartels or price-fixing scenarios.114 Private
interests can extract these rents because “the costs are diffused across numerous
consumers who individually lack the incentive to organize and protect themselves.”115
Even if the rent-seeking scheme fails, costs are still imposed by allowing companies to direct resources away from productive uses that would increase overall
welfare, such as innovating or finding ways to lower prices.116 As a result, those
resources migrate toward uses that simply transfer welfare, such as lobbying for
protective legislation or influencing regulators.117 The non-productive behavior is
effectively incentivized because granting the FTC “broader discretion over the creation and distribution of rents” will increase the expected return of that behavior.118
By substituting the consumer welfare standard for a multi-factor approach, private interests have an increased number of avenues by which they can rent-seek.119
Thus, the FTC is effectively less accountable to the public, which allows the
“agency to internalize the costs of poor decision-making.”120 The opacity and arbitrariness of such an approach makes it easier for the FTC to explain any resulting
outcome and harder for the FTC to be held accountable by a court or the public. 121
It thereby accords less certainty to regulatory outcomes and increases rent-seeking
behavior.122 Moreover, a broad, multi-factor approach would increase the scope of
cognizable antitrust actions, allowing companies to further engage in rent-seeking
behavior.123
The extensive and costly nature of antitrust actions incentivizes companies to
accuse their competitors of committing antitrust infractions.124 “Antitrust cases and
investigations can drag on for years; entail the collecting, processing, and production of millions of documents; and involve tremendous attorneys’ fees.” 125 Antitrust
suits have the ability to cause companies to divert tremendous amounts of resources
for years.126 Furthermore, if a company is charged with an infraction, its damages
may be trebled.127 The effect of such a policy would harm the competitor of any
company bringing the suit, eventually reducing the overall pool of competitors. 128

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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The solution to rent-seeking is the establishment of the rule of law. When agencies are subject to clear rules and held accountable to another body, the potential
for rent-seeking is reduced. Furthermore, the benefit is reflexive in nature. These
policies not only keep companies from engaging in rent-seeking but also cause
agencies to remain transparent and abstain from “manipulat[ing] outcomes to respond to rent-seeking incentives.”129 Antitrust enforcement functions at its best
when there “is a clear, well-established standard by which the public and the courts
can evaluate agency decisions and identify and correct any deviations that undermine consumer outcomes.”130
It is also important to note the U.S. has implemented policies similar to those
advocated by neo-brandeisians in the past.131 Prior to the adoption of the consumer
welfare standard, antitrust law was focused on broad social goals, “such as preventing bigness and preserving ‘small dealers and worthy men.’” 132 History has also
shown such policies were ineffective and opposed to consumer interests. 133 Now
there is widespread agreement among both sides of the political aisle that the consumer welfare standard improved antitrust law.134 “It offer[ed] an economicallygrounded framework for analyzing enforcement actions, and clear criteria the agencies (and private plaintiffs) must demonstrate to prove an antitrust violation.”135
This stymied rent-seeking and thereby allowed for consistency in antitrust adjudication.136

III. THE FTC’S RULEMAKING AUTHORITY AND SECTION
6(G)
While the FTC has historically held an important role in the U.S. economy and
among administrative agencies, recent proposals have suggested the possibility of
turning the FTC into a quasi-legislative organ.137 This transformation would allow
the FTC to define what constitutes unfair methods of competition for the purpose
of expanding the FTC’s ambit of enforcement authority.138 Such an expansion
would represent a usurpation of congressional authority and would “distract the
agency from its core mission of case-by-case expert application of the FTC Act
through administrative adjudication.”139
Section 6(g) of the FTC Act states the FTC has the power to “[f]rom time to
time classify corporations and . . . to make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this subchapter.”140 The FTC is being increasingly
pressured to use Section 6(g) of the FTC Act as authority to define unfair methods
of competition.141 However, Section 18 of the FTC already provides this ability to
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 46(g); Ohlhausen, supra note 1, at 5.
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the FTC.142 If Section 6(g) also gives the FTC this authority, then Section 18 is
relegated to mere surplusage, a result that was likely not intended by the legislature.
The FTC is given a few discrete grants of authority by Congress to make rules
to challenge unfair methods of competition.143 Under the FTC’s Part III adjudication authority, the FTC challenges a purported “unfair method of competition” by
first voting on whether to file a complaint regarding the actions. 144 The matter may
be immediately settled under a consent order; however, if it is not, FTC lawyers act
as prosecutors and engage in litigation.145 Complaint counsel—the FTC prosecutors—and the respondents engage in discovery, make pretrial motions, and argue
before an administrative law judge.146 After the judge renders a judgment, either
side has the opportunity to appeal to the Commission, which would review the findings de novo.147
The FTC may engage in “informal rulemaking” subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 553.148 These requirements include “adequate public notice of the proposed rule and a meaningful opportunity to
comment on the proposed rule.”149 The notice requirement or informal rulemaking
is intended to “afford interested persons a reasonable and meaningful opportunity
to participate in the rulemaking process.”150
A notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) is created to meet this end, which
requires “(1) the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved.”151 The comment requirement is intended to give the general public the
ability to have input in the rulemaking process. 152 After receiving input from the
general public, the agency is then required to create a statement of basis and purpose. Such a statement provides justification for the final rule adopted by the FTC
that addresses any significant comments the FTC believes would affect the final
rule.153 If the final rule differs from the proposed rule, it must be a “reasonably
foreseeable ‘logical outgrowth’ of the original proposed rule.” 154 The FTC is then
required to publish the final rule and general statement of the basis and purpose 30
days before the rule’s effective date.155
The targeted notice-and-comment requirements are the default standard for
rulemaking for the FTC; however, these rules are displaced when Congress necessitates a stricter standard.156 The FTC’s consumer protection rulemaking is subject
to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
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1975.157 While the Magnuson-Moss rulemaking requirements differ substantially
from NPRM requirements, both forms of rulemaking exist as clear grants of authority from Congress to the FTC.158 The grant provides detailed procedural guidance
or guidance on rulemaking topics and goals in Magnuson-Moss cases or detailed
guidance on rulemaking topics and goals in targeted notice-and-comment cases.159
If allowed to engage in rulemaking against unfair methods of competition under Section 6(g) of the FTC Act, the FTC would be “bounded neither by meticulous
procedural requirements nor by a specific Congressional mandate.”160 It would use
targeted notice-and-comment rulemaking to “directly regulate business conduct
across the economy with relatively few of the procedural protections that Congress
felt necessary for FTC’s trade regulation rules in the consumer protection context.”161 Furthermore, this move would disrupt the FTC’s role “as an expert caseby-case adjudicator of competition issues.” 162 In alleviating itself from the various
checks and balances found in typical, congressionally granted powers of rulemaking, it would become easy for the FTC to achieve its desired outcomes while circumventing any form of neutral arbiter.163
Most antitrust law requires “highly detailed, case-specific determinations” by
fact-finders to determine violations.164 This requirement helps to protect and enhance consumer welfare.165 A form of legislative rulemaking of the type proposed
here would not only disrupt but displace this process with bright-line rules that
would function as quasi-per se prohibitions.166 “By sacrificing the precision of caseby-case adjudication, rulemaking advocates are also losing one of the best tools we
have to account for ‘market dynamics, new sources of competition, and consumer
preferences.’”167

IV. CONCLUSION
The New Brandeis School’s ideas have seen a meteoric rise to the forefront of
antitrust policy in the past several years. The popularity of such ideas is understandable in an age where technology companies command a massive scale, and an evergreater portion of people’s lives resides online. However, the FTC’s abrogation of
the consumer welfare standard creates the ability to bring actions against companies
arbitrarily and with minimal oversight. The ability to specify new unfair methods
of competition under Section 6(g) likewise would confer an unprecedented ability
to alter legislative enactments. If seen to its logical conclusion, the FTC threatens
to become a central economic planner, a remedy that would necessarily be worse
than the disease.
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